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The Issue 
Since 2001 several of the largest agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada and the 
United States have battled impending bankruptcy or ceased operations. In February 2001 
Dairyworld  Foods  was  bought  out  by  Montreal  dairy  processor  and  cheese  producer 
Saputo  Inc.  (Saputo;  Toronto  Stock  Exchange).  In  November  2001,  Agricore,  formed 
through a 1998 merger of Alberta Wheat Pool Ltd. and Manitoba Pool Elevators, merged 
with United Grain Growers to form Agricore United (Agricore United). In the United 
States,  AgWay and Farmland Industries filed for  Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 
2002  (Reuters,  2000),  while  the  Saskatchewan  Wheat  Pool  (hereinafter  referred  to  as 
SWP or the Pool) underwent a massive debt restructuring in 2003 after four years of 
consecutive multi-million dollar net losses (SWP Annual Report, 2003). 
This decline in the market and financial performance of agricultural co-operatives has 
been associated with a decline in the commitment of the members to their co-operatives 
(Fulton, 1999; Fulton and Giannakas, 2001; Richards, Klein and Walburger, 1998; Burt 
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and  Wirth,  1990).  The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to examine  the  market  and  financial 
performance of one of a number of co-operatives that have faced recent financial and 
market hardships, and to link this performance to member commitment. Specifically, the 
article  examines  whether  the  Pool’s  declining  market  and  financial  performance  is 
consistent with the predictions that emerge from a model that examines the impact of 
falling member commitment in a co-operative. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Declining member commitment negatively affects a co-operative’s market and financial 
performance. When member commitment falls, a co-operative faces a trade-off between 
maintaining market share and maintaining its price markup. While a co-op can hold on to 
its market share by lowering its price markup, doing so will lead to falling profits.  
Comparing the events encountered by the Pool over the last several decades to the 
predicted  impact  of  declining  member  commitment  on  market  share  and  profitability 
reveals a close parallel. Based on views expressed by the membership, there is evidence 
of declining member commitment at the Pool beginning in the late 1970s. The decline in 
net earnings throughout the 1980s, despite a constant market share, is consistent with the 
hypothesis of a drop in member  commitment.  However, the  maintenance of  a market 
share in the 60 percent–plus range may have signaled to Pool management that member 
commitment was strong. 
Beginning  in  the  early  1990s,  the  Pool  began  a  period  of  expansion  and  facility 
modernization through intensive capital investment in value-added business lines and a 
grain handling system overhaul known as Project Horizon. Based on the view that its 
member  commitment  was  solid,  the  Pool  maintained  its  price  markup  in  an  effort  to 
generate the revenues required to finance the capital expenditures. The result, however, 
was not as management expected. The Pool’s market share dropped dramatically and the 
co-op experienced numerous consecutive net losses, which eventually forced the Pool to 
restructure its debt.  
SWP Financial and Market Performance 
Figure 1 shows the real net earnings and share of provincial grain handlings for SWP from 
1974 to 2003. Figure 1 also shows the chief executive officers for the same time period 
along the top of the figure, while the board chairmen are listed along the bottom.  
The  Pool’s  net  earnings  (solid  line  in  figure  1)  peaked  in  1981  at  $151  million 
(constant 2003 Canadian dollars). Net earnings continually declined from 1982 onward to 
a low of $7.4 million in 1989. There was a modest recovery in earnings throughout the 
1990s as net earnings ranged between $34.3 and $55.8 million. In 1999 the Pool posted its 
first net loss ($14.3 million); net losses have been reported each year since. In 2000 the 
Pool experienced its largest net loss to date ($97.7 million). Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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Figure 1  SWP real net earnings (constant 2003 C$) and provincial market share of grain 
handlings (1974–2003). 
Source: SWP Annual Reports; Schroeder et al.  
The  SWP’s  provincial  market  share  of  grain  handlings  (dotted  line  in  figure  1) 
reached 67 percent after its 1972 joint takeover of Federal Grain enabled the co-op to have 
a  virtual  monopoly  at  217  elevator  locations  (Fairbairn,  1984,  200).  Market  share 
remained  relatively  stable  into  the  1990s;  for  example,  in  1992  the  Pool’s  share  of 
provincial grain handlings was 61.2 percent (SWP Annual Report, 1992). Market share 
has  fallen  significantly  since  1999,  which  is  the  same  timeframe  for  the  Pool’s  most 
dramatic  decline  in  net  earnings.  The  Pool’s  current  (2003)  share  of  provincial  grain 
handlings is approximately 33 per cent (Schroeder and Chim, 2003). 
Figure  2  shows  the  Pool’s  long-term  debt  (measured  in  constant  2003  Canadian 
dollars) from 1974 to 2003 and the majority of capital investments in each of the last three 
decades. Capital investment in the 1990s was significant, with investments in this decade 
outnumbering the previous two decades combined. One of the major capital investments 
in the 1990s was Project Horizon, a $270 million upgrade and consolidation of the Pool’s 
grain handling division (SWP Annual Report, 1998). The Pool also made its first foreign 
direct investments in the 1990s, with the purchase of facilities in England, Poland and 
Mexico (SWP Annual Report, 1997). 
The solid line in figure 2 shows the Pool’s long-term debt from 1974 to 2003. Long-
term debt was relatively constant from 1974 to 1996 and never rose above $160 million. 
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The numerous acquisitions in the 1990s resulted in a rise in long-term debt from $93.6 
million in 1996 to over $518.7 million in 1999. A management change in 1999 resulted in 
the sale of several major business lines, which decreased long-term debt by $311 million 
from 2001 to 2003. 
One reason the Pool was able to take on this debt was its move to become publicly 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange in April 1996 (Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, n.d.). 
The Pool believed that in order to maintain market share and remain competitive it had to 
continue diversifying its activities and modernize its grain handling facilities. Since nearly 
half of the Pool’s members were set to retire in the 1990s – and in doing so they would 
take their retained member equity with them – it was believed that a capital shortage was 
likely  (CBC  Saskatchewan).  The  Pool’s  solution  was  to  convert  the  retained  member 
equity to tradable Class B shares, thus providing a much more long-term source of equity 
(Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1994). In spite of maintaining this equity, as well as adding 
more  through  a  1998  share  offering,  the  Pool’s  debt-to-equity  ratio  rose  significantly 
(Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1998). In 1985 the Pool’s debt-to-equity ratio was 0.61, by 
1995 it had risen to 0.72, and in 2000 the ratio was unmanageably high at 1.38 (SWP 
Annual Reports). It is interesting to note that the Pool had previously experienced high 
debt levels. For instance in 1973, the debt-to-equity ratio was 2.46, a result of the debt 
acquired to purchase Federal Grain Company (SWP Annual Report, 1974). 
The ability to service this debt depends in large part on the Pool’s market share along 
with the price markup the Pool is able to charge. As figure 1 shows, market share dropped 
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Figure 2  SWP long-term debt and acquisitions (1974–2003).  
Source: SWP Annual Reports 1974-2003. 
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sharply beginning in 1999, leading to substantial net losses. A key factor in determining 
market share is member commitment. The next section presents evidence that member 
commitment at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has declined over the last 20 to 25 years. 
Evidence of Declining Member Commitment 
As outlined in the Issue section of this article, a number of authors have indicated that 
member  commitment  in  co-operatives  may  be  falling  (Fulton,  1999;  Fulton  and 
Giannakas,  2001;  Richards,  Klein  and  Walburger,  1998;  Burt  and  Wirth,  1990).  This 
section  examines  the  evidence  of  falling  member  commitment  among  SWP  members 
from the 1970s through 2000. Five specific events are identified: (1) a lack of candidates 
for delegate elections; (2) the construction of inland grain handling terminals; (3) the 
pricing of farm supplies; (4) the Crow Rate debate; and (5) the closure of the Pool’s 
numerous small wooden elevators. 
In  the  SWP’s  democratic  structure,  members  directly  elect  delegates  in  their 
respective districts; the delegates from each district then elect a representative to the board 
of directors (SWP Annual Report, 2000). There were sixteen districts until April 2001, 
when the number of districts was decreased to twelve and two outside advisors  were 
appointed to assist the board members (SWP Annual Report, 2001). The structure was 
changed again in 2003 as a requirement of the SWP’s debt restructuring agreement; there 
still  remain  twelve  delegate-elected  board  members,  but  now  there  are  also  four 
independent board members elected by the delegates from a list of nominees selected by 
the corporate governance committee (SWP Annual Report, 2003).   
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s there was a lack of candidates to run for Pool 
delegate  elections  (Fairbairn,  1984,  205).  While  some  positions  were  being  filled  by 
acclamation, the situation had worsened to the point that by 1981 nearly 10 percent of the 
open positions did not have a single nomination. The delegate structure provides members 
with  direct  board  and  management  contact  and  gives  the  members  a  role  in  the  co-
operative’s decision-making process. A nomination shortage provides an indication that 
members lacked a desire to be involved in the running of their co-op and/or they felt 
involvement as a delegate had little impact on the co-op. Both of these interpretations are 
suggestive of falling member commitment. 
In 1970 the Palliser Triangle Wheat Grower’s Association (PTWGA) was formed and 
it  “quickly  became  a  major  irritation  for  Pool  leaders”  (Fairbairn,  1984,  215).  The 
members of the PTWGA questioned the power held by the Pool within the grain handling 
industry and wondered whether the Pool had altered its focus from addressing members’ 
problems to furthering its corporate stance.  Specifically, PTWGA  members  wanted to 
have (1) farmers rewarded financially for higher protein levels; (2) grain cleaned at the 
point of production in order to avoid paying freight on dockage screenings; and (3) eleva-
tors focused on moving grain rather than storing grain. The construction of a farmer-
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believed the system could be changed to address these concerns. Although SWP opposed 
the idea of an inland terminal, construction of the Weyburn Inland Terminal (WIT) went 
ahead, with 1,600 farmers in the Weyburn area purchasing $1000 shares. WIT became 
operational  in  November  1976;  it  was  the  first  of  11  inland  terminals  that  currently 
operate in the province of Saskatchewan (Herman, 2003; Driver, 2001). The effort of 
farmers to build an inland terminal in the face of strong opposition is an indication that 
members perceived that the Pool was not satisfying their needs and suggests that member 
commitment was weakening. 
In 1982, a communications study conducted by the Pool indicated that a substantial 
number  of  members  believed  the  Pool  was  overpricing  farm  supplies  compared  to 
competitors (Fairbairn, 1984, 235). One source of this dissatisfaction may have been the 
Pool’s method of pricing. The Pool at the time had a uniform pricing philosophy in which 
all  members  paid  the  same  prices  for  farm  supplies  regardless  of  volumes  purchased 
(Fairbairn, 1984, 193). Given the diversity that existed in the size of members’ purchases 
and the likelihood that competitors would target larger purchasers with volume discounts 
in an attempt to lure them away from the Pool, the adoption of a uniform pricing policy by 
the  Pool  meant  that  it  was  relying  on  member  commitment  to  some  degree  to  keep 
members buying from the Pool. The complaints regarding the Pool’s prices on farm inputs 
indicate that members were not pleased at having their commitment tested in this fashion 
and that perhaps the commitment was not as strong as management believed.  
The  Pool’s  uniform  pricing  philosophy  was  abolished  with  the  introduction  of 
AgShare in 1996 (SWP Annual Report, 1996). AgShare was a rewards incentive program 
based on the amount of business a member conducted with the Pool. This program was 
one of the first indications that the Pool had shifted from uniform pricing to differential 
pricing for its members, and suggests that falling member commitment was becoming a 
significant business issue. Institution of this program fourteen years after the 1982 survey 
on farm input prices reflects a response time that was likely too long to allow restoration 
of lost member commitment once the policy was changed. AgShare was eliminated in 
1998 and never reinstated despite Pool delegate efforts (Ewins, 1999a), thus compounding 
the problem. 
A major agricultural policy issue in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s was the Crow Rate 
subsidy and the manner in which it should be paid (Fulton, Rosaasen and Schmitz, 1989). 
The SWP and its membership were very involved in the debate around the Crow Rate, a 
debate that highlighted a significant division in Pool membership. At the 1980 and 1981 
annual meetings, Pool delegates voted in favour of  negotiating the sharing of railway 
costs  between  the  railways,  government  and  producers  (Fairbairn,  1984,  226;  Ewins, 
1981a). Pool members were displeased with the outcome of these votes since the long-
established stance of the SWP was to not negotiate on the Crow Rate.  
The  delegates  argued  that  they  took  the  position  they  did  because  the  transport 
minister, Luc Pepin, had pressured them to show they were willing to negotiate or face Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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being left out of future negotiations (Ewins, 1980). The president of the National Farmer’s 
Union, Ted Strain, sided with Pool members and openly proclaimed that the outcome of 
this vote had divided farmers and hurt the Pool (Ewins, 1981b). At a National Farmers 
Union  “Keep  the  Crow”  rally,  members  expressed  their  concern  by  passing  a 
recommendation that Pool president Ted Turner resign.  
In 1983 the transport minister announced legislative changes to the Crow Rate that 
called for the railway subsidy to be shared by farmers and railways (Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool,  1983a).  The  three  prairie  pools  (Saskatchewan  Wheat  Pool,  Manitoba  Pool 
Elevators and Alberta Wheat Pool) and the Quebec farm group Union des Producteurs 
Agricoles  aggressively  lobbied  for  the  act’s  subsidy  clause  to  be  revised  (Western 
Producer, 1983a). Pepin succumbed to the lobbying and amended the legislation so that 
the subsidy would remain  entirely  with the railways (Western Producer, 1983b).  This 
result irritated representatives from the Prairie Farm Commodity Coalition, the Canadian 
Cattlemen’s  Association,  United  Grain  Growers  and  Manitoba  Farm  Bureau,  as  these 
groups wanted the Crow benefit payments to be paid directly to farmers (Wilson, 1983).  
The Crow debate highlights a reduction in member commitment to the Pool and the 
policies  it  supported.  In  the  early  1980s,  almost  all  farmers  in  Saskatchewan  were 
members of SWP. As evidenced in the positions put forward by groups like the Prairie 
Farm  Commodity  Coalition,  the  Canadian  Cattlemen’s  Association  and  United  Grain 
Growers, farmers were not united in their positions on the Crow. While cattle producers 
generally favoured  a change in the  method of payment so farmers  would be paid the 
subsidy, grain farmers  were often split, with some favouring paying the railways  and 
others favouring paying the farmers. While the Pool enjoyed considerable support among 
those farmers who wished to see the Crow payment go to farmers, it was not supported 
(and was in some cases strongly opposed) by those who wished to see the Crow payment 
go to the railways. This opposition to the Pool’s policy positions reduced the likelihood 
that some farmers would deliver grain to the Pool, even if it offered competitive prices. 
The  Pool’s  decision  in  the  1990s  to  upgrade  and  consolidate  its  grain  handling 
facilities through the construction of inland terminals and the closure of almost all of its 
traditional elevators is widely identified as a damaging factor to member commitment 
(Ewins, 1999b). As part of Project Horizon, the Pool constructed 22 new facilities and 
closed  several  hundred  country  elevators  (SWP  Annual  Reports,  2000–2003).  While 
closing a local elevator may have made economic sense in terms of lowering the Pool’s 
costs of handling grain and earning premiums from the railways for providing larger train 
runs, the loss of a local elevator that farmers could easily and inexpensively access and 
that provided economic spin-offs to the local community left farmers bitter and reluctant 
to deliver to the Pool (Sproat, 1994). Farmers began putting the cost of trucking ahead of 
member commitment to the Pool and hauling their grain to the closest elevator even if it 
was not a Pool station.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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Theoretical Framework 
The previous section presented evidence that member commitment to the Pool declined 
over the 1980s and 1990s. The purpose of this section is to develop a model that links 
declining member commitment to the market and financial performance of a co-operative. 
The basis of the model is found in Fulton and Giannakas (2001). 
In  the  simplest  case,  consider  a  market  with  two  firms  –  a  co-operative  and  an 
investor-owned firm (IOF) – that sell a product to a group of farmers. The utility a farmer 
gets from purchasing the good from either the co-op or the IOF is given by 
(1)  Uc =U ! pc +"#   if the product is purchased from the co-op and 
(2)  Ui =U ! pi + µ 1!" ( )   if the product is purchased from the IOF, 
where Uc and Ui are the net consumer benefits associated with purchasing a unit of the 
product from the co-op and the IOF, respectively. The parameter U  is the per unit benefit 
associated with the consumption of the physical product/service and is common to all 
consumers. The prices charged by the co-op and the IOF are  pc  and pi, respectively. The 
parameters  !  and  µ  are non-negative utility enhancement factors while the variable  !  
takes values between zero and one and captures heterogeneous farmer characteristics. The 
term  !"  gives the utility that farmer with characteristic !  obtains from patronizing the 
co-op, while the term  µ 1!" ( ) is the utility this farmer gets from conducting business 
with  the  IOF.  Thus,  the  terms  !"   and  µ 1!" ( )  can  be  thought  of  as  commitment 
parameters, since they show the utility a farmer gets from conducting business with the 
co-op and the IOF, respectively. The critical parameter for the purposes of this article is! , 
since it provides a measure of the commitment farmers have to the co-operative. 
The above model can be interpreted according to work by Meyer and Allen (1997). In 
their model, agents (in this case, farmers) can be thought of as possessing two types of 
commitment:  affective  and  continuance  commitment.  Continuance  (or  calculative) 
commitment is the degree to which a member “needs” to remain with an organization; it 
can be represented by the term U ! pc  or U ! pi  in the utility function and is based on the 
price that is offered for the good that is being purchased. Affective commitment is the 
degree to which an agent “wants” to remain with an organization; it can be represented by 
the term !"  and µ 1!" ( ) for the co-op and IOF, respectively. 
Figure 3 graphs the farmers’ utility functions described in equations (1) and (2). The 
consumer at  !
" where the two utility functions intersect represents the farmer who is 
indifferent  between  conducting  business  with  the  co-op  and  the  IOF.  For  tractability, 
assume  that  farmers  are  uniformly  distributed  with  respect  to  the  characteristic  !  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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between the polar values of zero and one; as a result,  !
"determines the market share of 
the IOF. The market share of the co-op is given by  1!"
#. Mathematically, the market 
shares of the IOF and co-op can be written as: 
  xi =
µ ! pi + pc
" + µ
    xc =
! " pc + pi
! + µ
. 
Reduction in Member Commitment 
The impact of a reduction in member commitment, assuming no change in the co-op’s 
price pc , is determined by examining the effect of a change in the commitment parameter 
!  on the co-op’s market share. Since
!xc
!"
> 0, a reduction in member commitment leads 
to a loss in market share if the co-op does not change its pricing strategy.  
This loss of market share will also lead to a loss of profits, since profits are directly 
related to the product of market share and the price markup. Formally, the co-op’s profits 
!c  can be written as!c = pc " m ( )xc " F , where  m is the (constant) marginal cost of the 
co-op and  F is the fixed cost. A reduction in the price (and hence in the markup pc ! m ) 
charged by the co-op can help restore market share (consider the impact of an upward 
 
Figure 3  Member commitment model and market share determination. 
Source: Fulton, 1999 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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shift in the U ! pc + " #  curve), but profits are still affected, since the co-op earns a lower 
markup on its sales.  
The relationships among member commitment, the price markup and market share 
and  among  member  commitment,  the  price  markup  and  profits  can  be  derived 
mathematically. The first relationship is derived by substituting the best response function 
of the IOF into the market share equation of the co-op and solving for the price markup as 
a function of member commitment and market share (see Fulton and Giannakas, 2001, for 
a derivation of the IOF’s best response function). The second expression is derived by 
substituting the price markup and the market share expression derived immediately above 
into  the  co-op’s  profit  expression,  and  solving  for  the  price  markup  as  a  function  of 
member commitment and profit. Graphing the relationship that exists between the price 
markup and the member commitment parameter in these two expressions results in the 
iso-market share and iso-profit curves, respectively (the iso-market share expression, for 
instance, shows the relationship between the price markup and the member commitment 
parameter when market share is held constant).  
Formally, the equation for the iso-market share is given by 
(3)  pc ! m = µ 1!2xc ( )+2" 1! xc ( ), 
while the iso-profit equation is given by 
(4)  x =
1
2
2! + µ ( )±
1
2
2! + µ ( )
2 "8 # " FC ( ) ! + µ ( ) . 
Figure 4 graphs the relationship shown in equation (3),  while figure 5 graphs the 
relationship shown in equation (4). As figure 4 illustrates, the iso-market share curves 
shift  up  and  become  steeper  as  the  market  share  decreases.  Thus,  the  market  share 
associated with iso-market share curve  ! xc  is less than the market share denoted by iso-
market  share  curve xc.  A  decrease  in  member  commitment  from  !   to ! " ,  without  a 
change in the co-op’s price markup ( pc ! m ), leads to a fall in market share from  xc to 
! xc  (point A to B in figure 4). If the co-op wants to maintain its market share in the face of 
a drop in member commitment it will have to drop its price markup to  pc ! m ( )"  in order 
to move along the iso-market share curve  xc (point A to C in figure 4).  
The impact of reductions in member commitment and/or the price markup on the co-
op’s profit is shown in figure 5, which graphs three different iso-profit curves. The curve 
labeled  ! = 0 represents the combination of price markup and member commitment that 
results in zero profits for the co-op. The curves to the right and the inside of the  ! = 0 
curve show the combinations of price markup and member commitment that result in Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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increasingly higher levels of profit. For any given price markup, the greater the member 
commitment, the greater  will be the  market share and the greater  will be the co-op’s 
profit. The area to the left of the curve ! = 0 represents negative profits (Fulton, 1999). 
Suppose member commitment is initially at! . A drop in member commitment to ! " , 
accompanied by maintenance of the co-op’s price markup at pc ! m , will lead to falling 
profits (profits now equal ! " <" ).  The  co-op can retain its initial profit level (! ) by 
increasing its price markup to  pc ! m ( )"  (the movement to C in figure 5). However, as 
shown in figure 4, an increase in the price markup will lead to a falling market share, 
particularly if member commitment has fallen. 
The position of the iso-profit curves is also determined by the level of the co-op’s 
fixed costs (recall that  F  is an argument in the iso-profit function in equation (4)). An 
increase in fixed costs shifts the entire family of iso-profit curves rightward and inward. 
Put  another  way,  a  higher  fixed  cost  requires  a  higher  market  share  and/or  a  higher 
markup to generate the same level of profit.  A shift of the iso-profit curve due to an 
increase in fixed cost increases the potential for negative profits in the face of decreasing 
member  commitment.  For  instance,  while  the  member  commitment/price  markup 
combination  pc ! m ( )", " # { } generates positive profits for the fixed costs that are implied 
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by  the  graph  in  figure  5,  an  increase  in  fixed  costs  could  result  in  this  combination 
generating negative profits. 
Analysis 
The events encountered by the Pool since the late 1970s closely follow the predictions of 
the  member  commitment  theory  sketched  out  above.  As  was  discussed  earlier  in  this 
article, member commitment at the Pool in the 1980s – as evidenced by concerns over 
pricing philosophy and the debate over the Crow – was falling. Faced with this lower 
member commitment, the Pool lowered its price markup in order to retain market share. 
Interpreted in the context of figure 4, the Pool moved along its iso-market share curve 
from point A to C. This drop in its price markup, combined with the constant market 
share, lead to a drop in profits.  
In the 1990s, the Pool’s ambitious capital investment activities lead to a substantial 
rise in fixed costs. Interpreted in the context of figure 5, the rise in fixed costs shifted the 
family of iso-profit curves rightward. While the Pool might have been able to generate 
positive profits had member commitment been maintained, such was not the case. Instead, 
a continued fall in member commitment resulted in the Pool operating outside its iso-
profit curves and earning negative profits (as was noted earlier, the Pool has posted net 
losses since 1999). The Pool attempted to increase its profits by raising its price markup, 
 
Figure 5  Iso-profit curves for the co-operative. 
Source: Fulton, 1999 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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which  in  combination  with  falling  member  commitment  lead  to  the  dramatic  drop  in 
market share the company experienced. 
In summary, the Pool can be interpreted as moving along its iso-market share curve in 
the 1980s; the result was declining net earnings while the market share was retained. This 
maintenance of market share may even have contributed to a belief at the Pool that it 
could count on its members’ business, a factor that may have been at work when the Pool 
made its large investment in new grain handling facilities. Indeed, it is possible that had 
the Pool been able to retain its market share after it undertook its major investments in the 
1990s, it might have been able to earn a profit. However, this did not occur; the Pool 
experienced a sharp drop in market share that, along with the increased debt load, resulted 
in the significant losses the Pool has experienced since 1999. 
Conclusion 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has experienced a dramatic reversal of fortune over the 
last 30 years. In the 1970s and the early 1980s the Pool was clearly the dominant player in 
the grain handling sector in Saskatchewan, and indeed on the Prairies. It had a market 
share of more than 65 percent and it played a major role in farm policy debates and policy 
formation.  Over  the  next  20  years,  the  role  of  the  Pool  in  Saskatchewan  and  Prairie 
agriculture declined somewhat. Although it was still the largest grain handling company, 
its earnings had slipped and it was no longer a dominant force in agricultural policy (in 
large part because the Crow debate indicated that the Pool could not speak for all Prairie 
farmers on agricultural policy issues). One interpretation of the reason for this slip in the 
Pool’s influence was the loss of member commitment that it experienced. 
In  the  1990s,  the  Pool  attempted  to  reestablish  itself  as  the  major  player  in  the 
industry by undertaking a very large capital investment program. This program, and in 
particular the construction of new country elevator facilities, appears to have been built on 
a  belief  that  the  Pool  had  access  to  a  large  and  committed  membership.  This  belief, 
however, was incorrect; the dramatic losses of both market share and profitability that the 
Pool experienced beginning in the late 1990s are consistent with the view that member 
commitment at the Pool had declined substantially. Member commitment is the glue of a 
co-op’s existence, and the evidence suggests this glue had weakened considerably; the 
weakening was not an overnight phenomenon but rather a process that had been underway 
since at least the early 1980s. 
While  this  article  provides  some  evidence  that  the  Pool’s  market  and  financial 
fortunes were affected by changes in member commitment, additional research is needed 
to examine and weigh the other factors that have affected the SWP over the years. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  K. Lang and M. Fulton 
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